When as Prime Minister I became responsible for the efficient administration of every department of the Government, I took every opportunity *Commander* afforded me officially or unofficially of *fiance** acquainting myself with the major questions which affected the conduct of the War in every branch of the public service. The Admiralty and the Shipping Controller brought to my notice all the problems arising out of the struggle on the High Seas. The Shipping Controller soon formed a poor opinion of the Admiralty Board. But my most reliable inside information on the naval aspect of my problem came from another source. I was fortunate enough to obtain the same access to men who had seen active service on the seas as I had already secured in land warfare. I owe much to Commander Kenworthy for making me acquainted at this critical stage with the views of the younger officers in the Navy. I was introduced to Kenworthy through the good offices of the late Sir Herbert Lewis, who was then Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education. I met some of these junior officers and I realised that there was a school of highly intelligent naval men who were very critical of the High Admirals and their methods. They condemned severely their anti-submarine plans. They were scornful of their opinions on the subject of convoys. But

what provoked their hostility more than anything
was the chilly discouragement accorded by those at
Headquarters to any proposals or suggestions from
men who were actively engaged in the struggle on the
High Seas. When it is borne in mind that the Admirals
had themselves filed a petition in bankruptcy to the
War Cabinet, as far as their own stock of new ideas
was concerned, this lofty disdain of any offer to